Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2018

Complementary Monopolies with Asymmetric Information

Résumé

We investigate how asymmetric information on final demand affects strategic interaction between a downstream monopolist and a set of up-stream monopolists, who independently produce complementary inputs. We study an intrinsic private common agency game in which each supplier i independently proposes a pricing schedule contract to the assembler, specifying the supplier's payment as a function of the assembler's purchase of input i. We provide a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition. A lot of equilibria satisfy this condition but there is a unique Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium from the suppliers' point of view. In this equilibrium there are unavoidable efficiency losses due to excessively low sales of the good. However, suppliers may be able to limit these distortions by implicitly coordinating on an equilibrium with a rigid (positive) output in bad demand circumstances.

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A comme version hal-02470541 Preprint Didier Laussel, Joana Resende. Complementary Monopolies with asymmetric information. 2023. ⟨hal-02470541⟩

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halshs-01944314 , version 1 (04-12-2018)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01944314 , version 1

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Didier Laussel, Joana Resende. Complementary Monopolies with Asymmetric Information. 2018. ⟨halshs-01944314⟩
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