Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game
1
GREDEG -
Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion
2 Bocconi University & IGIER
3 UNIMIB - Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca = University of Milano-Bicocca
4 UPF - Universitat Pompeu Fabra [Barcelona]
5 ICREA - Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats = Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies
2 Bocconi University & IGIER
3 UNIMIB - Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca = University of Milano-Bicocca
4 UPF - Universitat Pompeu Fabra [Barcelona]
5 ICREA - Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats = Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies
Giuseppe Attanasi
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 170602
- IdHAL : giuseppe-attanasi
- ORCID : 0000-0003-0848-5770
- IdRef : 186270321
Résumé
We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral predictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees’ belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.
Domaines
Economies et finances Méthodes et statistiques Sciences de l'Homme et Société Sciences cognitivesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game
|
Résumé |
en
We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral predictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees’ belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.
|
Auteur(s) |
Giuseppe Attanasi
1
, Pierpaolo Battigalli
2
, Elena Manzoni
3
, Rosemarie Nagel
4, 5
1
GREDEG -
Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion
( 185786 )
- GREDEG - Bâtiment 2 - Campus Azur du CNRS - 250 rue Albert Einstein - CS 10269 - F
06905 SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS Cedex
- France
2
Bocconi University & IGIER
( 467033 )
- Italie
3
UNIMIB -
Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca = University of Milano-Bicocca
( 60273 )
- Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1 - 20126, Milano
- Italie
4
UPF -
Universitat Pompeu Fabra [Barcelona]
( 128785 )
- Plaça de la Mercè, 10-12 - 08002 Barcelona
- Espagne
5
ICREA -
Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats = Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies
( 300218 )
- Passeig Lluís Companys 23, 08010 Barcelona
- Espagne
|
Volume |
167
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Page/Identifiant |
341–360
|
Date de publication |
2019-11
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Collaboration/Projet |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.002 |
Loading...