Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts
Jean Beuve
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 12385
- IdHAL : jean-beuve
- ORCID : 0000-0002-3551-3725
- IdRef : 158131908
Stéphane Saussier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 180337
- IdHAL : stephane-saussier
- ORCID : 0000-0003-0166-3941
- IdRef : 080280889
Résumé
Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public-to-private contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-to-private contracts and that the use of rigidity clauses in public contracts rises when political risks are more salient. We argue that a significant part of the increased rigidity of public contracts is a contractual adaptation to limit political hazards from political opponents and interested third parties.
Format du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public-to-private contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-to-private contracts and that the use of rigidity clauses in public contracts rises when political risks are more salient. We argue that a significant part of the increased rigidity of public contracts is a contractual adaptation to limit political hazards from political opponents and interested third parties.
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Titre |
en
Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts
|
Auteur(s) |
Jean Beuve
1
, Marian Moszoro
2, 3
, Stéphane Saussier
4
1
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
2
George Mason University [Fairfax]
( 452410 )
- 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, Virginia 22030
- États-Unis
3
Warsaw School of Economics
( 152669 )
- Warsaw
- Pologne
4
IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School
( 300334 )
- 8 bis, rue de la Croix Jarry, 75013, Paris
- France
|
Date de publication électronique |
2018-07-02
|
Volume |
28
|
Numéro |
2
|
Page/Identifiant |
316-335
|
URL éditeur |
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jems.12268
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2019
|
Voir aussi |
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Procurement, Political Contestability, Contractual Rigidity
|
DOI | 10.1111/jems.12268 |
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