Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Année : 2019

Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts

Résumé

Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public-to-private contracts feature more rigidity clauses than private-to-private contracts and that the use of rigidity clauses in public contracts rises when political risks are more salient. We argue that a significant part of the increased rigidity of public contracts is a contractual adaptation to limit political hazards from political opponents and interested third parties.

Dates et versions

halshs-02057712 , version 1 (05-03-2019)

Identifiants

Citer

Jean Beuve, Marian Moszoro, Stéphane Saussier. Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2019, 28 (2), pp.316-335. ⟨10.1111/jems.12268⟩. ⟨halshs-02057712⟩
95 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More