The speed of convergence in congestion games under best-response dynamics
1
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
2 C2I - Centre for Computational Intelligence [Nanyang]
3 GSSI - Gran Sasso Science Institute
4 DISIM - Department of Information Engineering, Computer Science and Mathematics = Dipartimento di Ingegneria e Scienze dell'Informazione e Matematica [L'Aquila]
5 Dipartimento di Scienze - Universita di Chieti-Pescara
2 C2I - Centre for Computational Intelligence [Nanyang]
3 GSSI - Gran Sasso Science Institute
4 DISIM - Department of Information Engineering, Computer Science and Mathematics = Dipartimento di Ingegneria e Scienze dell'Informazione e Matematica [L'Aquila]
5 Dipartimento di Scienze - Universita di Chieti-Pescara
Angelo Fanelli
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 179296
- IdHAL : angelo-fanelli
- ORCID : 0000-0002-4896-6889
Luca Moscardelli
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 881317
Résumé
We investigate the speed of convergence of best response dynamics to approximately optimal solutions in congestion games with linear delay functions. In Ackermann et al. [2008] it has been shown that the convergence time of such dynamics to Nash equilibrium may be exponential in the number of players n. Motivated by such a negative result, we focus on the study of the states (not necessarily being equilibria) reached after a limited number of players' selfish moves, and we show that Θ(n log log n) best responses are necessary and sufficient to achieve states that approximate the optimal solution by a constant factor, under the assumption that every O(n) steps each player performs a constant (and nonnull) number of best responses. We show that such result is tight also for the simplest case of singleton congestion games.
Format du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
The speed of convergence in congestion games under best-response dynamics
|
Résumé |
en
We investigate the speed of convergence of best response dynamics to approximately optimal solutions in congestion games with linear delay functions. In Ackermann et al. [2008] it has been shown that the convergence time of such dynamics to Nash equilibrium may be exponential in the number of players n. Motivated by such a negative result, we focus on the study of the states (not necessarily being equilibria) reached after a limited number of players' selfish moves, and we show that Θ(n log log n) best responses are necessary and sufficient to achieve states that approximate the optimal solution by a constant factor, under the assumption that every O(n) steps each player performs a constant (and nonnull) number of best responses. We show that such result is tight also for the simplest case of singleton congestion games.
|
Auteur(s) |
Angelo Fanelli
1, 2
, Michele Flammini
3, 4
, Luca Moscardelli
5
1
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
2
C2I -
Centre for Computational Intelligence [Nanyang]
( 43664 )
- School of Computer Engineering Centre for Computational Intelligence Nanyang Technological University Blk N4, #B1a-02, Nanyang Avenue Singapore 639798
- Singapour
3
GSSI -
Gran Sasso Science Institute
( 262452 )
- Viale F. Crispi 7, 67100 L'Aquila, Italy
- Italie
4
DISIM -
Department of Information Engineering, Computer Science and Mathematics = Dipartimento di Ingegneria e Scienze dell'Informazione e Matematica [L'Aquila]
( 242004 )
- Università degli Studi dell'Aquila, Via Vetoio, I-67100 L'Aquila
- Italie
5
Dipartimento di Scienze - Universita di Chieti-Pescara
( 95956 )
- viale Pindaro 42 - 65127 Pescara
- Italie
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2012-07-01
|
Volume |
8
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
1-15
|
Domaine(s) |
|
DOI | 10.1145/2229163.2229169 |
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