Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections
Hélène Ollivier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 171136
- IdHAL : ollivier-helene
- ORCID : 0000-0002-9486-033X
- IdRef : 165030984
Leo Simon
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 958309
Résumé
How do voters' behavioural biases affect political outcomes? We study this question in a model of Downsian electoral competition in which candidates have private information about the benefits of policies, and voters may infer candidates' information from their electoral platforms. If voters are Bayesian, candidates ‘anti-pander’ – they choose platforms that are more extreme than is justified by their private beliefs. However, anti-pandering is ameliorated if voters' inferences are subject to confirmation bias. Voter confirmation bias causes elections to aggregate candidates' information better, and all observers, whether biased or Bayesian, would like the voters in our model to exhibit more confirmation bias than they do themselves.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections
|
Résumé |
en
How do voters' behavioural biases affect political outcomes? We study this question in a model of Downsian electoral competition in which candidates have private information about the benefits of policies, and voters may infer candidates' information from their electoral platforms. If voters are Bayesian, candidates ‘anti-pander’ – they choose platforms that are more extreme than is justified by their private beliefs. However, anti-pandering is ameliorated if voters' inferences are subject to confirmation bias. Voter confirmation bias causes elections to aggregate candidates' information better, and all observers, whether biased or Bayesian, would like the voters in our model to exhibit more confirmation bias than they do themselves.
|
Auteur(s) |
Antony Millner
1
, Hélène Ollivier
2, 3
, Leo Simon
4, 5
1
UC Santa Barbara -
University of California [Santa Barbara]
( 300693 )
- Santa Barbara, CA 93106
- États-Unis
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
LBNL -
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory [Berkeley]
( 82005 )
- 1 Cyclotron Rd. MS 50A-1148, Berkeley, CA 94720
- États-Unis
5
Monash University [Melbourne]
( 469589 )
- Victoria 3800, Australia
- Australie
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Numéro d'article |
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2020-05
|
Volume |
185
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Confirmation bias, Electoral competition, Pandering, Signaling
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104175 |
UT key WOS | 000531026900001 |
Loading...