From Inefficient Behind-The-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model*
Résumé
We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two layers of informational asymmetries. Private information of Home producers on costs affects the design of “behind-the-border” policies reflecting the political influence of inefficient producers. Home’s supply is contracted, causing trade, and motivating the use of tariffs. Eliminating those instruments by means of a trade agreement may become impossible once Home has also private information on its redistributive concerns. Home, when subject to strong influence by inefficient producers, might be reluctant to adopt Free Trade, which may lead to limited tariff cuts and give a role for export subsidies.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
From Inefficient Behind-The-Border Policies to Inefficient Trade Agreements: A Two-Tier Asymmetric Information Model*
|
Résumé |
en
We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two layers of informational asymmetries. Private information of Home producers on costs affects the design of “behind-the-border” policies reflecting the political influence of inefficient producers. Home’s supply is contracted, causing trade, and motivating the use of tariffs. Eliminating those instruments by means of a trade agreement may become impossible once Home has also private information on its redistributive concerns. Home, when subject to strong influence by inefficient producers, might be reluctant to adopt Free Trade, which may lead to limited tariff cuts and give a role for export subsidies.
|
Auteur(s) |
Antoine Bouët
1, 2
, David Laborde
1
, David Martimort
3, 4
1
IFPRI -
International Food Policy Research Institute [Washington]
( 69448 )
- INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 2033 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-1002
- États-Unis
2
GREThA -
Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée
( 27589 )
- Avenue Léon Duguit 33608 PESSAC
- France
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Date de publication |
2021-05
|
Volume |
131
|
Numéro |
636
|
Page/Identifiant |
1555-1592
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Asymmetric Information, Double-Edged Incentives, Tariff Equilibrium, Behind-The-Border Policies, Trade Negotiations
|
DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueaa085 |
Loading...