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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2023

Voter coordination in elections : a case for approval voting

Résumé

We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three-candidate elections. We consider three rules, that differ on the number of candidates that voters can support: Plurality (one), Anti-Plurality (two) and Approval Voting (one or two). We show that the Condorcet winner is always elected at some equilibrium under Approval Voting, and that this rule provides better welfare guarantees than Plurality. We then numerically study a dynamic process of political tâtonnement which delivers rich insights. The Condorcet winner is virtually always elected under Approval Voting, but not under the other rules. The dominance of Approval Voting is robust to several alternative welfare criteria and the introduction of expressive voters.
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Dates et versions

halshs-03162184 , version 1 (08-03-2021)
halshs-03162184 , version 2 (07-02-2024)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-03162184 , version 2

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François Durand, Antonin Macé, Matias Nunez. Voter coordination in elections : a case for approval voting. 2023. ⟨halshs-03162184v2⟩
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