Communication with forgetful liars - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Theoretical Economics Année : 2021

Communication with forgetful liars

Résumé

I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium distribution of lies aggregated over all possible realizations of the states. The approach is used to shed light on when the full truth is almost surely elicited, and when multiple lies can arise in equilibrium. Elaborations are proposed to shed light on why non-trivial communication protocols are used in criminal investigations.

Dates et versions

halshs-03229984 , version 1 (19-05-2021)

Licence

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-03229984 , version 1
  • DOI : 10.3982/te4154
  • WOS : 000656956000010

Citer

Philippe Jehiel. Communication with forgetful liars. Theoretical Economics, 2021, 16 (2), pp.605-638. ⟨10.3982/te4154⟩. ⟨halshs-03229984⟩
41 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More