Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline
Résumé
We develop a political economy theory of the endogenous emergence of fiscal crises based on the idea that the adjustment mechanism to a crisis favors some social groups, that may be induced ex-ante to vote for fiscal policies that are more likely to lead to a crisis. Greater levels of favoritism lead to a higher public debt and more frequent crises, as well as to higher public expenditure, if the favored group is large enough. We provide conditions under which the favored group strategically favors a weaker state's fiscal capacity and when constitutional limits on debt raise the utility of all poor.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline
|
Résumé |
en
We develop a political economy theory of the endogenous emergence of fiscal crises based on the idea that the adjustment mechanism to a crisis favors some social groups, that may be induced ex-ante to vote for fiscal policies that are more likely to lead to a crisis. Greater levels of favoritism lead to a higher public debt and more frequent crises, as well as to higher public expenditure, if the favored group is large enough. We provide conditions under which the favored group strategically favors a weaker state's fiscal capacity and when constitutional limits on debt raise the utility of all poor.
|
Auteur(s) |
Gilles Saint-Paul
1, 2
, Davide Ticchi
3
, Andrea Vindigni
4
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
Marche Polytechnic University
( 349309 )
-
- France
4
UniGe -
Università degli studi di Genova = University of Genoa
( 302889 )
- Via Balbi, 5 - 16126 Genova
- Italie
|
Date de publication |
2021-11
|
Volume |
33
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
583-610
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Entitlements, Favoritism, Fiscal capacity, Fiscal crises, Populism, Public debt
|
DOI | 10.1111/ecpo.12175 |
UT key WOS | 000633836400001 |
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