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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2021

STRICT LIABILITY, SCARCE GENERIC INPUT AND DUOPOLY COMPETITION

Résumé

This paper analyzes the impact of strict liability on imperfect competition and shows first that it is not an obstacle to achieving a socially optimal level of care. Second, this result is compromised when firms face a scarce generic asset. Under this asset limitation, this paper shows that competition (here a Cournot-Nash duopoly) leads to a lower level of prevention even if more product at lower price is supplied at the equilibrium. Introducing standards linked to operating permits improves the economy's safety level but may lead firms to exit.
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Dates et versions

halshs-03502602, version 1 (26-12-2021)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-03502602 , version 1

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Gérard Mondello. STRICT LIABILITY, SCARCE GENERIC INPUT AND DUOPOLY COMPETITION. 2021. ⟨halshs-03502602⟩

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