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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2021

The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly

Evens Salies

Résumé

This paper extends the basic unilateral accident model to allow for Cournot competition. Two firms compete with production input and prevention as strategic variables under asymmetric capacity constraints. We find that liability regimes exert a crucial influence on the equilibrium price and outputs. Strict liability leads to higher output and higher risk compared to negligence. We also study the conditions under which both regimes converge.
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Dates et versions

halshs-03502605, version 1 (26-12-2021)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-03502605 , version 1

Citer

Gérard Mondello, Evens Salies. The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly. 2021. ⟨halshs-03502605⟩

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