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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2022

Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner's) curse?

Résumé

Two players receiving independent signals on a risky project with common value compete to be the first to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of this preemption game as the publicity of signals varies. Private signals create a winner's curse: the first mover suspects that his rival might have privately received adverse information, hence exited. To compensate, players seek more evidence supporting the project, resulting in later investment. A conservative planner concerned with avoiding unprofitable investments may then prefer private signals. Our results suggest that policy interventions should primarily tackle winner-takes-all competition, and regulate transparency only once competition is sufficiently mild.
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Dates et versions

halshs-03507030, version 1 (03-01-2022)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-03507030 , version 1

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Catherine Bobtcheff, Raphaël Levy, Thomas Mariotti. Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner's) curse?. 2022. ⟨halshs-03507030⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 21/04/2024
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