The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2022

The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation

Résumé

We offer an approach to cooperation in repeated games of private monitoring in which players construct models of their opponents' behavior by observing the frequencies of play in a record of past plays of the game in which actions but not signals are recorded. Players construct models of their opponent's behavior by grouping the histories in the record into a relatively small number of analogy classes to which they attach probabilities of cooperation. The incomplete record and the limited number of analogy classes lead to misspecified models that provide the incentives to cooperate. We provide conditions for the existence of equilibria supporting cooperation and equilibria supporting high payoffs for some nontrivial analogy partitions.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
wp_202223_.pdf (621.58 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

halshs-03754101 , version 1 (19-08-2022)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-03754101 , version 1

Citer

Philippe Jehiel, Larry Samuelson. The Analogical Foundations of Cooperation. 2022. ⟨halshs-03754101⟩
65 Consultations
44 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More