Competition between securities markets: stock exchange industry regulation in the Paris financial center at the turn of the twentieth century
Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 19541
- IdHAL : pierre-cyrille-hautcoeur
- ORCID : 0000-0002-7094-3026
- IdRef : 08306978X
Angelo Riva
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1158768
- ORCID : 0000-0003-3301-2297
- IdRef : 109151046
Résumé
We study two regulatory changes that affected competition between the transparent Parquet and the OTC-like Coulisse markets in Paris at the turn of the twentieth century. The two reforms determined three regimes of competition—illegal competition, free competition, and enforced monopoly. After documenting institutional changes and their political economy, we show that the Paris market touch (i.e., the average spread of securities traded in the two markets) widened under the free competition regime but narrowed under the enforced monopoly regime to a size much smaller than during the first. These results accord with recent literature that questions the effects of competition between transparent and opaque markets; a transparent monopoly might be more effective than competition if the latter involves opaque markets.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
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Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Competition between securities markets: stock exchange industry regulation in the Paris financial center at the turn of the twentieth century
|
Résumé |
en
We study two regulatory changes that affected competition between the transparent Parquet and the OTC-like Coulisse markets in Paris at the turn of the twentieth century. The two reforms determined three regimes of competition—illegal competition, free competition, and enforced monopoly. After documenting institutional changes and their political economy, we show that the Paris market touch (i.e., the average spread of securities traded in the two markets) widened under the free competition regime but narrowed under the enforced monopoly regime to a size much smaller than during the first. These results accord with recent literature that questions the effects of competition between transparent and opaque markets; a transparent monopoly might be more effective than competition if the latter involves opaque markets.
|
Auteur(s) |
Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur
1, 2
, Amir Rezaee
3
, Angelo Riva
1, 2, 4
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
ISG -
ISG International Business School [Paris]
( 426089 )
- 8 rue de Lota - 75116 Paris
- France
4
EBS Paris -
European Business School Paris
( 192527 )
- 10 Rue Sextius Michel, 75015 Paris
- France
|
Commentaire |
Early Access : JUN 2022
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Date de publication |
2023
|
Volume |
17
|
Page/Identifiant |
261-299
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Commentaire(s) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Paris stock exchange, Market microstructures, Regulation, Monopoly, Consolidation, Fragmentation, Spreads
|
DOI | 10.1007/s11698-022-00248-7 |
UT key WOS | 000817823400001 |
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