The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
1
CREST -
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
2 X - École polytechnique
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics
4 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
5 UNIL - Université de Lausanne = University of Lausanne
6 CEP - LSE - Centre for Economic Performance
7 IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics
8 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
9 CESifo
2 X - École polytechnique
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics
4 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
5 UNIL - Université de Lausanne = University of Lausanne
6 CEP - LSE - Centre for Economic Performance
7 IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics
8 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
9 CESifo
Julien Combe
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1183575
- IdHAL : combejumd
Olivier Tercieux
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1183578
Résumé
To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. Using a rich dataset on teachers’ applications in France, we estimate teachers preferences and perform a counterfactual analysis. The results show that these mechanisms perform much better than the modified version of deferred acceptance. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more than triples under our mechanism.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
|
Résumé |
en
To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. We identify a class of strategy-proof mechanisms that cannot be improved upon in terms of both efficiency and fairness. Using a rich dataset on teachers’ applications in France, we estimate teachers preferences and perform a counterfactual analysis. The results show that these mechanisms perform much better than the modified version of deferred acceptance. For instance, the number of teachers moving from their positions more than triples under our mechanism.
|
Auteur(s) |
Julien Combe
1, 2
, Olivier Tercieux
3, 4
, Camille Terrier
5, 6, 7, 8, 9
1
CREST -
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
( 2579 )
- 5, Avenue Henry Le Chatelier
91120 Palaiseau
- France
2
X -
École polytechnique
( 300340 )
- École polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex
- France
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
UNIL -
Université de Lausanne = University of Lausanne
( 97916 )
- CH-1015 Lausanne
- Suisse
6
CEP - LSE -
Centre for Economic Performance
( 151088 )
- Centre for Economic Performance
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street
London
WC2A 2AE
UK
- Royaume-Uni
7
IZA -
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics
( 237214 )
- Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5-9 D-53113 Bonn Germany
- Allemagne
8
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
9
CESifo
( 143566 )
- Allemagne
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2022-11
|
Volume |
89
|
Numéro |
6
|
Page/Identifiant |
3154-3222
|
Domaine(s) |
|
DOI | 10.1093/restud/rdac002 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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