Managing Relational Contracts
Marta Troya-Martinez
(1)
,
Liam Wren-Lewis
(2, 3)
Liam Wren-Lewis
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 735557
- IdHAL : liam-wren-lewis
- ORCID : 0000-0003-3739-5328
- IdRef : 188942882
Résumé
Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm owner and a supplier. Yet, in a variety of organizations, relationships are overseen by an intermediary such as a manager. Such arrangements open the door for collusion between the manager and the agent. This paper develops a theory of such managed relational contracts. We show that managed relational contracts differ from principal–agent ones in important ways. First, kickbacks from the agent can help solve the manager’s commitment problem. When commitment is difficult, this can result in higher agent effort than the principal could incentivize directly. Second, making relationships more valuable enables more collusion and hence can reduce effort. We also analyze the principal’s delegation problem and show that she may or may not benefit from entrusting the relationship to a manager.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Managing Relational Contracts
|
Résumé |
en
Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm owner and a supplier. Yet, in a variety of organizations, relationships are overseen by an intermediary such as a manager. Such arrangements open the door for collusion between the manager and the agent. This paper develops a theory of such managed relational contracts. We show that managed relational contracts differ from principal–agent ones in important ways. First, kickbacks from the agent can help solve the manager’s commitment problem. When commitment is difficult, this can result in higher agent effort than the principal could incentivize directly. Second, making relationships more valuable enables more collusion and hence can reduce effort. We also analyze the principal’s delegation problem and show that she may or may not benefit from entrusting the relationship to a manager.
|
Auteur(s) |
Marta Troya-Martinez
1
, Liam Wren-Lewis
2, 3
1
New Economic School
( 326364 )
-
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Date de publication |
2023-06
|
Volume |
21
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
941-986
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
DOI | 10.1093/jeea/jvac049 |
UT key WOS | 000860173900001 |
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