The Quran and the Sword
1
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
2 University of Namur
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics
4 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
5 PUC-Rio - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro [Brasil] = Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro [Brazil] = Université catholique pontificale de Rio de Janeiro [Brésil]
2 University of Namur
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics
4 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
5 PUC-Rio - Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro [Brasil] = Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro [Brazil] = Université catholique pontificale de Rio de Janeiro [Brésil]
Résumé
This paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially make a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants toco-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains only where the autocrat’s intrinsic legitimacy and the loyalty of his army are strong while the organizational strength of religious movements is rather low. Radical institutional reforms can then be implemented. Rent economies where ultra-conservative clerics are powerful enough to block any institutional reform that they dislike represent another polar case. Empirically, the dominant regime in contemporary Muslim countries is the regime of double co-option where the autocrat resorts to a double-edged tactic: pleasing the official clerics by slowing the pace of reforms, and ensuring the loyalty of the military to be able to put down an opposition instigated by rebel clerics.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
This paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially make a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants toco-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains only where the autocrat’s intrinsic legitimacy and the loyalty of his army are strong while the organizational strength of religious movements is rather low. Radical institutional reforms can then be implemented. Rent economies where ultra-conservative clerics are powerful enough to block any institutional reform that they dislike represent another polar case. Empirically, the dominant regime in contemporary Muslim countries is the regime of double co-option where the autocrat resorts to a double-edged tactic: pleasing the official clerics by slowing the pace of reforms, and ensuring the loyalty of the military to be able to put down an opposition instigated by rebel clerics.
|
Titre |
en
The Quran and the Sword
|
Auteur(s) |
Emmanuelle Auriol
1
, Jean-Philippe Platteau
2
, Thierry Verdier
3, 4, 5
1
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
( 1002422 )
- Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse
- France
2
University of Namur
( 1056148 )
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
PUC-Rio -
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro [Brasil] = Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro [Brazil] = Université catholique pontificale de Rio de Janeiro [Brésil]
( 362752 )
- R. Marquês de São Vicente, 225 - Gávea, Rio de Janeiro - RJ, 22451-900, Brésil
- Brésil
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2022
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Autocracy, Army, Instrumentalization of religion, Islam, Reforms
|
DOI | 10.1093/jeea/jvad015 |
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