The Quran and the Sword - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of the European Economic Association Année : 2022

The Quran and the Sword

Résumé

This paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially make a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants toco-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains only where the autocrat’s intrinsic legitimacy and the loyalty of his army are strong while the organizational strength of religious movements is rather low. Radical institutional reforms can then be implemented. Rent economies where ultra-conservative clerics are powerful enough to block any institutional reform that they dislike represent another polar case. Empirically, the dominant regime in contemporary Muslim countries is the regime of double co-option where the autocrat resorts to a double-edged tactic: pleasing the official clerics by slowing the pace of reforms, and ensuring the loyalty of the military to be able to put down an opposition instigated by rebel clerics.

Dates et versions

halshs-03957299 , version 1 (26-01-2023)

Identifiants

Citer

Emmanuelle Auriol, Jean-Philippe Platteau, Thierry Verdier. The Quran and the Sword. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2022, ⟨10.1093/jeea/jvad015⟩. ⟨halshs-03957299⟩
17 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More