Nursing home choice, family bargaining, and optimal policy in a Hotelling economy
Marie‐louise Leroux
(1, 2)
,
Gregory Ponthiere
(3, 4, 5, 6)
1
UQAM -
Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal
2 UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics
4 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
5 ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique
6 IUF - Institut universitaire de France
2 UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics
4 PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
5 ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique
6 IUF - Institut universitaire de France
Marie‐louise Leroux
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1210622
- ORCID : 0000-0002-1502-6639
Gregory Ponthiere
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1129355
- ORCID : 0000-0002-7328-4441
- IdRef : 189782714
Résumé
We develop a model of family bargaining to study the impact of the distribution of bargaining power within the family on the choice of nursing homes by families, and on the locations and prices chosen by nursing homes in a Hotelling economy. In the baseline (static) model, where the dependent parent cares only about the location of the nursing home, the markup of nursing homes is increasing in the bargaining power of the dependent parent, and nursing homes are located at the extreme periphery. We compare the laissez-faire with the social optimum (which involves more central locations of nursing homes), and examine its decentralization in first-best and second-best settings. We explore the robustness of our results to introducing a bequest motive in a dynamic overlapping generations model, which allows us to study the joint dynamics of wealth accumulation and nursing home prices. If the bequest motive is strong, the markup is decreasing in the bargaining power of the dependent. However, wealth accumulation, by reducing interest rates, raises markup rates and nursing homes prices.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Nursing home choice, family bargaining, and optimal policy in a Hotelling economy
|
Résumé |
en
We develop a model of family bargaining to study the impact of the distribution of bargaining power within the family on the choice of nursing homes by families, and on the locations and prices chosen by nursing homes in a Hotelling economy. In the baseline (static) model, where the dependent parent cares only about the location of the nursing home, the markup of nursing homes is increasing in the bargaining power of the dependent parent, and nursing homes are located at the extreme periphery. We compare the laissez-faire with the social optimum (which involves more central locations of nursing homes), and examine its decentralization in first-best and second-best settings. We explore the robustness of our results to introducing a bequest motive in a dynamic overlapping generations model, which allows us to study the joint dynamics of wealth accumulation and nursing home prices. If the bequest motive is strong, the markup is decreasing in the bargaining power of the dependent. However, wealth accumulation, by reducing interest rates, raises markup rates and nursing homes prices.
|
Auteur(s) |
Marie‐louise Leroux
1, 2
, Gregory Ponthiere
3, 4, 5, 6
1
UQAM -
Université du Québec à Montréal = University of Québec in Montréal
( 360045 )
- Université du Québec à Montréal CP 8888, succursale Centre-ville Montréal (Québec) H3C 3P8
- Canada
2
UCL -
Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain
( 92863 )
- Place de l'Université 1 - 1348 Louvain-La-Neuve
- Belgique
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
ERUDITE -
Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique
( 1004415 )
- Université Gustave Eiffel, 5 boulevard Descartes, 77454 Marne-la-Vallée CEDEX 2
UPEC - Faculté de sciences économiques et de gestion
Mail des mèches Rue Poète et Sellier 94010 Créteil Cedex
- France
6
IUF -
Institut universitaire de France
( 56663 )
- Maison des Universités 103 Boulevard Saint-Michel 75005 Paris
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2020-08
|
Volume |
22
|
Numéro |
4
|
Page/Identifiant |
899-932
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Domaine(s) |
|
DOI | 10.1111/jpet.12327 |
UT key WOS | 000551482300004 |
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