Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents
Francis Bloch
(1, 2)
,
David Cantala
Francis Bloch
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 743522
- IdHAL : francis-bloch
- IdRef : 131891502
David Cantala
- Fonction : Auteur
Résumé
We analyze the dynamic assignment of objects to agents organized in a constant size waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing and organs for transplants. We analyze the optimal design of probabilistic queuing disciplines, punishment schemes, and information release. With private values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to the lottery, but waste is lower at the lottery. With common values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to any other mechanism, and waste is minimized at the lottery. Punishment schemes accelerate turnover in the queue and information release increases the value of agents at the top of the waiting list.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents
|
Résumé |
en
We analyze the dynamic assignment of objects to agents organized in a constant size waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing and organs for transplants. We analyze the optimal design of probabilistic queuing disciplines, punishment schemes, and information release. With private values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to the lottery, but waste is lower at the lottery. With common values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to any other mechanism, and waste is minimized at the lottery. Punishment schemes accelerate turnover in the queue and information release increases the value of agents at the top of the waiting list.
|
Auteur(s) |
Francis Bloch
1, 2
, David Cantala
1
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PJSE -
Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 578027 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Date de publication |
2017
|
Volume |
9
|
Numéro |
1
|
Page/Identifiant |
88–122
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Commentaire |
Publication issue du Document de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2014.66 - ISSN : 1955-611X
https://hal.science/halshs-01109667v1
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Financement |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Dynamic matching, Queuing, Queuing disciplines, Social housing, Organ transplant
|
DOI | 10.1257/mic.20150183 |
UT key WOS | 000397142300004 |
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