The analogical foundations of cooperation - HAL Access content directly
Journal articles Journal of Economic Theory Year : 2023

The analogical foundations of cooperation

Abstract

We offer an approach to cooperation in repeated games of private monitoring in which players construct models of their opponents' behavior by observing the frequencies of play in a record of past plays of the game in which actions but not signals are recorded. Players construct models of their opponent's behavior by grouping the histories in the record into a relatively small number of analogy classes for which they estimate probabilities of cooperation. The incomplete record and the limited number of analogy classes lead to misspecified models that provide the incentives to cooperate. We provide conditions for the existence of equilibria supporting cooperation and equilibria supporting high payoffs for some nontrivial analogy partitions.
Loading...

Dates and versions

halshs-04331552, version 1 (08-12-2023)

Licence

Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives - CC BY 4.0

Identifiers

Cite

Philippe Jehiel, Larry Samuelson. The analogical foundations of cooperation. Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, 208, pp.105609. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2023.105609⟩. ⟨halshs-04331552⟩
10 View
0 Download
Last update date on 5/12/24
How are these indicators produced

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More