Repeated Majority Voting - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Working Paper) Année : 2024

Repeated Majority Voting

Résumé

We propose a general model of repeated voting in committees and study equilibrium behavior under alternative majority rules. We find that repetition may significantly increase the efficiency of majority voting through a mechanism of intertemporal logrolling, agents sometimes voting against their immediate preference to benefit the group’s long-term interest. In turn, this affects the comparison of majority rules, which may differ significantly relative to the static setting. The model provides a rationale for the use of super-majority rules, while accounting for the prevalence of consensus in committee voting.
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Dates et versions

halshs-04610689 , version 1 (13-06-2024)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-04610689 , version 1

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Antonin Macé, Rafael Treibich. Repeated Majority Voting. 2024. ⟨halshs-04610689⟩
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