We examine the enforcement of two pillars of colonial rule in French West Africa, military conscription and head tax collection, using novel district-level data from 1919 to 1949. Colonial states are often characterized as either omnipotent Leviathans or administration on the cheap. Our findings reveal their notable coerciveness in achieving key objectives. Military recruitment targets were consistently met, even amid individual avoidance and poor health conditions, by drawing on a pool of eligible fit young men. Tax compliance was similarly high, with approximately 80% of the liable population meeting obligations. Spikes in head tax rates significantly increased tax-related protests, likely prompting caution among colonial administrators. The tax burden was adjusted according to perceived district affluence, and tax moderation was applied in times of crisis. However, local shocks such as droughts or cash crop price collapses were largely ignored. These results underscore the capacity of colonial states to enforce their authority despite limited policy responsiveness, offering new insights into the political economy of colonial governance.