Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda
Jérôme Lang
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1116819
- ORCID : 0000-0001-6789-9573
- IdRef : 061649783
Ali Ozkes
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1200887
- ORCID : 0000-0002-8720-2494
Résumé
We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters’ preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: a voter’s preference over an issue might be dependent on the other issue. When the collective decision in this context is reached by voting on both issues at the same time, multiple election paradoxes may arise, as studied extensively in the theoretical literature. In this paper we pursue an experimental approach and investigate the impact of iterative voting, in which groups deliberate by repeating the voting process until a final outcome is reached. Our results from experiments run in the lab show that voters tend to have an optimistic rather than a pessimistic behaviour when casting a vote on a non-separable issue and that iterated voting may in fact improve the social outcome. We provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis of individual and collective behavior in the multiple referendum setting.
Format du dépôt | Fichier |
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Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda
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Résumé |
en
We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters’ preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: a voter’s preference over an issue might be dependent on the other issue. When the collective decision in this context is reached by voting on both issues at the same time, multiple election paradoxes may arise, as studied extensively in the theoretical literature. In this paper we pursue an experimental approach and investigate the impact of iterative voting, in which groups deliberate by repeating the voting process until a final outcome is reached. Our results from experiments run in the lab show that voters tend to have an optimistic rather than a pessimistic behaviour when casting a vote on a non-separable issue and that iterated voting may in fact improve the social outcome. We provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis of individual and collective behavior in the multiple referendum setting.
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Auteur(s) |
Umberto Grandi
1
, Jérôme Lang
2, 3
, Ali Ozkes
4, 5
, Stéphane Airiau
2
1
IRIT -
Institut de recherche en informatique de Toulouse
( 34499 )
- 118 Route de Narbonne, F-31062 Toulouse Cedex 9
- France
2
LAMSADE -
Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision
( 989 )
- Place de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16
- France
3
CNRS -
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
( 441569 )
- France
4
SKEMA Business School
( 214127 )
- Campus Sophia Antipolis 60 rue Dostoïevski 06902 Sophia Antipolis
- France
5
GREDEG -
Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion
( 185786 )
- GREDEG - Bâtiment 2 - Campus Azur du CNRS - 250 rue Albert Einstein - CS 10269 - F
06905 SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS Cedex
- France
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URL éditeur |
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-022-01436-0
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
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Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
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Nom de la revue |
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Date de publication |
2022-12-10
|
Projet(s) ANR |
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Domaine(s) |
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DOI | 10.1007/s00355-022-01436-0 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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