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Article Dans Une Revue Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications Année : 2005

Sellers dilemna due to social interactions between customers

Résumé

In this paper, we consider a discrete choice model where heterogeneous agents are subject to mutual influences. We explore some consequences on the market's behaviour, in the simplest case of a uniform willingness to pay distribution. We exhibit a first-order phase transition in the profit optimization by the monopolist: if the social influence is strong enough, there is a regime where, if the mean willingness to pay increases, or if the production costs decrease, the optimal solution for the monopolist jumps from a solution with a high price and a small number of buyers, to a solution with a low price and a large number of buyers. Depending on the path of prices adjustments by the monopolist, simulations show hysteretic effects on the fraction of buyers.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00078451 , version 1 (08-06-2006)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00078451 , version 1

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Mirta Gordon, Jean-Pierre Nadal, Denis Phan, Jean Vannimenus. Sellers dilemna due to social interactions between customers. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2005, 356 (2-4), pp.628-640. ⟨halshs-00078451⟩
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