Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Journal Articles European Economic Review Year : 2008

Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence

Abstract

This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. The main result shows that the settlement rule tends to chill bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations, which implies that automated negotiation is not able to promote agreements. However, this perverse effect depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. The implications of these results are then used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputation mechanisms in Cyberspace.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
Dispute-EER-WP.pdf (625.68 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin Files produced by the author(s)
Loading...

Dates and versions

halshs-00259453 , version 1 (28-02-2008)

Licence

Identifiers

Cite

Yannick Gabuthy, Nicolas Jacquemet, Nadège Marchand. Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence. European Economic Review, 2008, 52 (2), pp.259-282. ⟨10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.04.004⟩. ⟨halshs-00259453⟩
168 View
451 Download

Altmetric

Share

More