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Other Publications Documents de travail du Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne Year : 2021

Decision Under Normative Uncertainty


While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the 'original position', where one's future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty — normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle — maximising expected value ( 'Expectationalism') — has different formulations, namely Ex-Ante Expectationalism, Ex-Post Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.
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Dates and versions

halshs-02905431 , version 1 (23-07-2020)
halshs-02905431 , version 2 (17-03-2021)
halshs-02905431 , version 3 (12-07-2021)
halshs-02905431 , version 4 (13-10-2021)




  • HAL Id : halshs-02905431 , version 4


Franz Dietrich, Brian Jabarian. Decision Under Normative Uncertainty. 2021. ⟨halshs-02905431v4⟩
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