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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2015

Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences

Résumé

In this paper we examine the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We prove that, under a mild condition, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As implication, we show that when the property of citizen sovereignty holds, strategy proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash implementation and we prove that these theories are equivalent.
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Dates et versions

halshs-01226803 , version 1 (10-11-2015)
halshs-01226803 , version 2 (05-01-2017)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01226803 , version 1

Citer

Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Doghmi, Abdelmonaim Tlidi. Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences. 2015. ⟨halshs-01226803v1⟩
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