We study the formation of multilayer networks where payoffs are determined by the de- grees of players in each network. We begin by imposing either concavity or convexity in degree on the payoff function of the players. We then explore distinct network relationships that result from inter- and intra-network spillovers captured by the properties of supermod- ularity/submodularity and strategic complementarity respectively. We show the existence of equilibria and characterize them. Additionally, we establish both necessary and sufficient con- ditions for an equilibrium to occur. We also highlight the connection, in equilibrium, between inter-network externalities and the identity of linked players in one network given the identity of linked players in the other network. Furthermore, we analyze efficient multilayer networks. Finally, we extend our models to contexts with more than two layers, and scenarios where agents receive a bonus for being connected to the same individuals in both networks.
We study the formation of multilayer networks where payoffs are determined by the de- grees of players in each network. We begin by imposing either concavity or convexity in degree on the payoff function of the players. We then explore distinct network relationships that result from inter- and intra-network spillovers captured by the properties of supermod- ularity/submodularity and strategic complementarity respectively. We show the existence of equilibria and characterize them. Additionally, we establish both necessary and sufficient con- ditions for an equilibrium to occur. We also highlight the connection, in equilibrium, between inter-network externalities and the identity of linked players in one network given the identity of linked players in the other network. Furthermore, we analyze efficient multilayer networks. Finally, we extend our models to contexts with more than two layers, and scenarios where agents receive a bonus for being connected to the same individuals in both networks.
1
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 1169844 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully 6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
Université Lumière - Lyon 2 ( 33804 )
;
Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne ( 300284 )
;
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR5824 ( 441569 )
2
GAEL -
Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble
( 1043256 )
- Domaine Universitaire - BATEG, 1241 rue des Résidences
38400 St Martin d'Hères
- France
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR 5313 ( 441569 )
;
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement UMR 1215 ( 577435 )
;
Université Grenoble Alpes ( 1042703 )
;
Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology ( 1043329 )
;
Université Grenoble Alpes ( 1042703 )
3
Georges Washington University, Department of Economics, Monroe Hall, Suite 340 2115 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20052 USA. Email: sumjos@gwu.edu
( 1172142 )
- États-Unis
4
Department of Economics, George Washington University.
( 1172143 )
- États-Unis
5
Virginia Tech [Blacksburg]
( 47147 )
- Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg, VA 24061-0002
- États-Unis
Public visé
Scientifique
Volume
213
Page/Identifiant
105718
Langue du document
Anglais
Nom de la revue
Journal of Economic Theory
(ISSN : 0022-0531, ISSN électronique : 1095-7235)
Publié par Elsevier
Revue non référencée dans Sherpa-Romeo
Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Sumit Joshi, Ahmed Saber Mahmud, Sudipta Sarangi. A Model of the Formation of Multilayer Networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, 213, pp.105718. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2023.105718⟩. ⟨halshs-04192333⟩